Oracle Database Security

Identifying Yourself In The Database

PeteFinnigan.com Limited Oracle Security

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Oracle Database Security Presentation

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Agenda

- What is "identity theft
- Identity at the database level
- Accountability
- Database Identity spoofing
- Detecting spoofing
- Preventing identity theft in the database

Identity Theft

- 54,100,000 results in Google search for "**Identity Theft**"!
- Identity theft is a crime!
- Someone pretends to be someone else and uses their identity
- First coined in 1964 So an "old issue"
- Usually to gain access to someone else's resources or to gain benefits as someone else

Identity Theft In the Database

- Not really the same as in the news? ... but really it is
- Someone could pretend to be a DBA
- Someone could pretend to be a business user
- Someone could steal or gain access to someone else's resources or credit
- For example: "I could as an employee of a company apply for a loan in someone else's name and then channel the payout check to my house but make sure the original victim makes the payments every month"
- It is also a "database" level issue not just a "people" level issue, people use databases

Database Accountability

- What sort of accountability is possible in the database?
 - Core Audit
 - Fine Grained Audit (FGA)
 - Trigger based audit for DML
 - System triggers
 - Redo / streams / CDC
 - Listener logging
 - SYSDBA core audit
 - SYSDBA trace
 - Application trace
 - ...
- Lots of possibilities / Correlation also possible

Accountability / Identity?

- As you may have guessed; accountability is not useful without "identity"
- Accountability is making sure each persons actions are accountable to them
- Theft or masquerading is possible if you can be someone else in the database
- In other words let the database think you are someone else
- Knowing the masquerade took place is not possible without accountability or "Audit" or at least very transient session data

Default Situation in the database NOW

- Simple core audit in 10gR2, 11gR1 / R2
- Listener log turned on by default in 10 and 11g
- Core SYSDBA connection audit is on by default
 - Trace files on Unix
 - Event Log entries on Windows
- Redo Logs always available; not necessarily archivea
- But these features are not accountability to achieve that we need:
 - A log or Audit or trace With
 - Attribution back to real people
 - In other words a complete solution

What is Actually Available?

- On the surface:
 - 9i No real accountability not supported anyway!!
 - 10g incredibly limited
 - 11g Slightly better but only because of Audit vault
- Actual accountability when layered onto audit is not good
 - Limited session values
 - Not all of the session is written to the audit trail anyway
 - Possible to write session values but we must do it manually
- What is possible if we use core audit features?
- The message:- "Audit and accountability is our job; We must design it like any other feature of our systems"

Higher Level Summary Of Now

- General lack of accountability in the database
 - Some audit by default situation is changing
 - Oracle identity products (don't see many using), secerno...
- No standard reports (audit)
- No audit management built in
 - Changing now dbms_audit_mgmt is here but again basic
 - Supports archive/purge/clean
 - Moving in right direction but maybe because of audit vault?
- No Privileged audit by default

• If audit is enabled then some better options for accountability exits

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Example – Listener Log

- A number of possible log entry formats
- 11gR1 has XML log as well

Can correlate records – in this case using time

This is the only place we have the full client "program" "path/name"

• Very Limited details – database user not always shown

C:\>sqlplus system/oracle1@ora11gpe

 \ldots {gives}...

24-NOV-2012 16:11:49 *

(CONNECT_DATA=(SERVER=DEDICATED)(SERVICE_N AME=orallgpe)(CID=(PROGRAM=C:\odc\product\ 11.1.0\client 1\sqlplus.exe)(HOST=ORACLE-HACK-BOX)(USER=Pete))) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=127.0.0.1)(PO RT=7240)) * establish * orallgpe * 0

PeteFinnigan.com Limited Oracle Security	A lot of details but not that many useful details for accountability directly	
Session Details	SQL id's may be useful if used in a session Rows removed to make it fit on one slide	
SQL> exec print_table('select ' sid from v\$mystat)');	* from v\$session where sid = (select distinct	
AUDSID	: 1852215	
USERNAME	: SYSTEM	
SCHEMANAME	: SYSTEM	
OSUSER	: Pete	
MACHINE	: WORKGROUP\ORACLE-HACK-BOX	
TERMINAL	ORACLE-HACK-BOX	
PROGRAM	: sqlplus.exe	
TYPE	USER	
SQL_EXEC_START	: 24-nov-2012 17:01:52	
MODULE	: SQL*Plus	
ACTION	:	
CLIENT_INFO	:	
LOGON_TIME	: 24-nov-2012 16:11:49	
CLIENT_IDENTIFIER	:	
SERVICE_NAME	: orallgpe	

Session Details Using SYS_CONTEXT

SQL> @check_2		SYS CONTEXT is a			
User	:SYSTEM	convenience for selecting			
Username	:SYSTEM	session values.			
Current User	:SYSTEM				
Session User	:SYSTEM	Most values can be			
Proxy User	:				
Action	:	selected from v\$session			
SessionID	:1852215	anyway.			
Client Identifier	:				
Client Info	:	BUT SOME like IP Address			
Entry ID	:	are not directly available			
Host	:WORKGROUP\ORACLE-HAC	K-BOX			
IP Address	:127.0.0.1				
Module	:SQL*Plus				
Terminal	:ORACLE-HACK-BOX				
OS User	:Pete				

I will put this on my site

Check_2.sql – For Information


<pre>Eile Edit Format View Help declare cursor c_main is select user, username, sys_context('USERENV', 'CURRENT_USER') curr, sys_context('USERENV', SESSION_USER') sess, sys_context('USERENV', SESSION_USER') curs, sys_context('USERENV', 'CURRENT_SCHEMA') curs, sys_context('USERENV', 'CURRENT_SCHEMA') curs, sys_context('USERENV', 'SESSIOND') sessid, sys_context('USERENV', 'ACTION') act, sys_context('USERENV', 'ACTION') act, sys_context('USERENV', 'CLIENT_IDENTIFIER') cli, sys_context('USERENV', 'IENTRYID') entid, dbms_output.put_line('User dbms_output.put_line('Session User i 1/_main.sess); dbms_output.put_line('Ession User i 1/_main.sess); dbms_output.put_line('Ession User i 1/_main.sess); dbms_output.put_line('Client Info i' 1/_main.sess); dbms_output.put_line('Host i' 1/_main.ind'); dbms_output.put_line('Host i' 1/_main.ind'); dbms_output.put_line('SUSer i' 1/_main.ses; end loop; dbms_output.put_line(''); end; </pre>
<pre>cursor c_main is select user, username, sys_context('USERENV','CURRENT_USER') curr, sys_context('USERENV', SESSION_USER') sess, sys_context('USERENV', CURRENT_CHA') curs, sys_context('USERENV', 'CURRENT_SetMA') curs, sys_context('USERENV', 'PROXY_USER') prox, sys_context('USERENV', 'ACTION') act, sys_context('USERENV', 'CLIENT_IDENTIFIER') cli, sys_context('USERENV', 'CLIENT_IDENTIFIER') cli, sys_context('USERENV', 'CLIENT_IDENTIFIER') cli, sys_context('USERENV', 'IP_ADDRESS') ipd, sys_context('USERENV', 'HOST') host, sys_context('USERENV', 'HOST') host, sys_context('USERENV', 'IP_ADDRESS') ipd, sys_context('USERENV', 'MODULE') module, sys_context('USERENV', 'MODULE') module, sys_context('USERENV', 'OS_USER') os from user_USErs; begin for lv_main in c_main loop dbms_output.put_line('User :' lv_main.user); dbms_output.put_line('Session User :' lv_main.ess); dbms_output.put_line('Session User :' lv_main.ess); dbms_output.put_line('Session User :' lv_main.ess); dbms_output.put_line('Client Info :' lv_main.sessid); dbms_output.put_line('Client Info :' lv_main.clif; dbms_output.put_line('Client Info :' lv_main.clif; dbms_output.put_line('Host dbms_output.put_line('IP_Address :' lv_main.term); dbms_output.put_line('Terminal :' lv_main.co;); end loop; dbms_output.put_line('');</pre>

PeteFinnigan.com Limited Audit is set to the "DB" as default; OS user is in **Oracle Security** spare1,

Privilege used and action# can be converted or DBA_AUDIT_TRAIL used instead

Core Audit in AUDS

The stark lack of accountability is striking!!!



SYSDBA Trace

- Fixed format trace files
- Core trace cannot be turned off
- Records user, os user, terminal etc
- Not many people in my experience look at them
- Files cycle based on PID (on Unix) performance bugs on some platforms
- SYSDBA trace audit_sys_operations can be written here also

These trace files are written to the OS because audit cannot be written for database startup and shutdown to the database

Also helps with separation

Other Sources of Data

- The Alert Log contains information at the system level
- Trace files can include:
 - Action
 - Module
 - Client_ID
 - Session ID
- And of course data in the form of binds or in static SQL
- Structure in the form of table and code

Other Sources Of Data (2)	The SID and SERIAL are not preserved in the audit trail
SQL> alter session set events '10046 trace name cont Session altered.	We could save them with a logon trigger
 SQL> alter session set events '10046 trace name con Session altered.	Time based correlation can be used.

- *** SESSION ID:(142.347) 2012-11-24 19:50:53.116
- *** CLIENT ID:() 2012-11-24 19:50:53.116
- *** SERVICE NAME:(orallgpe) 2012-11-24 19:50:53.116
- *** MODULE NAME:(SQL*Plus) 2012-11-24 19:50:53.116
- *** ACTION NAME:() 2012-11-24 19:50:53.116

SQL> exec print_table('select * from v\$session where sid=(select distinct sid from v\$mystat)'); SADDR : 2F0E3D30 SID : 142 SERIAL# : 347 AUDSID : 1852215

Issues And Discrepancies

- Obvious things are missing in the Core Audit
 - Action, Module
 - Program
 - Sid, Serial
- Some things are there though
 - Session value can be used to correlate to other audit
 - SESSIONID, AUDSID
- There is a lack of depth to identity; very little to go on
- What is obvious is that we need to use alternate audit to get more details
- Some detail is only available in the comment text of the audit trail

Customising Identity

- We can customise identity
- Interestingly after logon and during logon (depending on the API used)
 - Client Info can be set
 - Client identifier can be set
 - Module can be set
 - Action can be set
 - Custom contexts can be created
 - We can use data values
 - Indeed we can use anything selectable from the database
- Customising before logon seems better... BUT....

Customising Identity Example

SQL> select client_identifier from v\$session

2 where sid=(select distinct sid from v\$mystat);

CLIENT_IDENTIFIER

SQL> exec dbms_session.set_identifier('Hack the planet!');

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL> select client_identifier from v\$session

2 where sid=(select distinct sid from v\$mystat);

CLIENT_IDENTIFIER

Hack the planet!

Customising Identity Example (2)

SQL> select sys_context('USERENV','SESSIONID') from dual;

SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','SESSIONID')

1854567

SQL> alter user orascan identified by orascan;

User altered.

SQL> select client_id from dba_audit_trail

2 where sessionid=1854567;

CLIENT_ID

Hack the planet!

Customising Identity

- The other main session values that can be customised easily through the SQL Interface are
- Action DBMS_APPLICATION_INFO.SET_ACTION('Action Name')
- Module DBMS_APPLICATION_INFO.SET_MODULE('Module Name','Action Name')
- Client Info DBMS_APPLICATION_INFO.SET_CLIENT_INFO('Client Info Text');
- BUT; these do not permeate to the Core Audit trail

Core Audit

- Core audit from an identity point of view doesn't provide enough – recurring message !!!
- We need to provide the additional information ourselves
- Like lots of data security implementation tasks it is the customers job to design and implement the security
 - This includes technical security controls
 - Audit trail design and reports
 - Identity requirements
 - We have limited options though with just core audit
- Just like designing screens, tables, views we have to design security as well

Application Contexts/ Secure App Roles

- Often used for controlling access and for controlling policies in VPD, FGA, LBAC, Audit
- The context or the role often provides additional security
 BUT often uses core values to control its enablement

```
Create role my_role using orablog.role_admin;
...
If(sys_context(`USERENV','IP_ADDRESS') = 192.168.254.2) then
    dbms_session.set_role(`MY_ROLE');
....
Create context my_con using orablog.init_con;
...
If(sys_context(`USERENV','PROGRAM')=`sqlplus') then
    dbms_session.set_context(`MY_CON','app_role','Manager');
```

```
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```

The Bad News!

- Almost all context/session values can be spoofed either in
 - The session
 - Sys_context
 - AUD\$
 - Trace files
 - Listener logs
 - ...
- Some things are easy to spoof
 - Identifier DBMS_SESSION
 - Module, Action, Info DBMS_APPLICATION_INFO

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Spoofing

• Some a little harder, but not much

SQL> alter session set current_schema = scott; Session altered.

SQL> select schemaname from v\$session

2 where sid=(select distinct sid from v\$mystat);

SCHEMANAME

SCOTT

SQL> select sys_context('USERENV','CURRENT_SCHEMA') from dual;

```
SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','CURRENT_SCHEMA')
```

SCOTT

Other ways to do this on patched databases

Spoofing (2)

 Some even harder (needs privileges) – works on unpatched 11.1.0.6 (and other un-patched versions) – as a user with IMP_FULL_DATABASE

SQL> connect importer/importer@oral1gpe							
Connected.							
SQL> @check							
USER	USERNAME	CURR	SESS	SCHEM			
IMPORTER	IMPORTER	IMPORTER	IMPORTER	IMPORTER			
SQL> exec sys.kupp\$proc.change_user('SYS');							
BEGIN sys.kupp\$proc.change_user('SYS'); END;							
SQL> @check							
USER	USERNAME	CURR	SESS	SCHEM			
SYS	SYS	SYS	SYS	SYS			

Spoofing (3)

- Most of the rest of the fields need programming skills to spoof or use of a network proxy where relevant
- It has been written that the only values in session, AUD\$ and FGA_LOG\$ that are completely reliable are the database USERNAME – <u>http://www.integrigy.com/security-</u> <u>resources/analysis/Integrigy</u> **Spoofing** <u>Oracle</u> <u>Session</u> <u>Infor</u> <u>mation.pdf</u>
- As we saw this is not true because BECOME USER can be used on non-patched systems BUT can be audited
- IP address is harder to spoof but not impossible
- JDBC is the easiest to use to spoof values
- OCI is harder and has less flexibility

Spoofing (4)

- Most of the core values such as
 - OS User
 - Process ID
 - Terminal
 - Program
 - Machine
- Can be spoofed easily using a thin Java client
- Therefore they are not reliable to specify identity

```
Spoofing (5)
```

C:\>java DBC jdbc:oracle:thin:@127.0.0.1:1521:oral1gpe orascan orascan 1 0

SQL*Client : Version 0.1 Very Alpha

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```
SQL> set program "My Client" ;
SQL> set osuser "Oracle" ;
SQL> connect ;
...
SQL> exec print_table('select osuser,module,program from v$session where
    audsid=1856376');
OSUSER : Oracle
MODULE : My Client
PROGRAM : My Client
```

Spoofing (6)

SQL> select spare1 from sys.aud\$ where sessionid=1856376;

SPARE1 Oracle

SQL>

- The only values making it through to the audit trail is OS USER – set here to "Oracle" and held in Spare 1
- With the 11.2 JDBC driver it can be started with a property –Doracle.jdbc.v\$session.osuser=...

Spoofing (7)

- Even dates can be spoofed by setting the initialisation parameter fixed_date
- This can be set with ALTER SYSTEM
- The session would show the same date/time always
- The Audit trail will show the same date/time
- The logon would also show the same date time
- If audit were enabled on ALTER SYSTEM this would be caught
- Or the hacker can change dates when he wishes

Spoofing Summary

- A small set of values can be spoofed easily via Java
- Other customisable values are easier to spoof with any client
- Security (Logon Triggers, FGA policies, VPD, OLS, Secure Contexts, Secure Application roles...) often rely on session values
- Session values are often central to security
- These values cannot be trusted, therefore security is compromised as are audit trails (potentially)

Solutions?

- Each client needs to set a unique value(s) to specify identity
- Don't control via spoofable values or at least not a set of spoofable values
- Use application level data? issues?
- Proxy users currently cannot be spoofed so use them
- Maybe use a handshake approach
 - Ask the database for a unique value
 - Process it encrypt / hash / PKI (no simple PKI in PL/SQL available, can be done in Java or C)
 - Send it to the database as client_id
 - Database can "know" the real value
 - Issues predictable?, interceptable?
 - It's a hard issue to solve

Can We Detect Spoofing?

- The "Pinnacle" detect spoofing?
- It is not easy BUT "no one" in real terms is probably spoofing your database.....OR are they? – would you know
- If anyone did spoof you well; they would take whatever they needed from your databases
- Detecting:
 - Check all records in a session for changed values in that session
 - some values will be set after logon CLIENT ID
 - Some actions will be detected if audited BECOME USER
 - Time analysis
 - Usage analysis resource effort profile anomalies?

Conclusions

- Spoofing of session values is easy even without extra access
- Spoofing of application or unique values is only easy if access is available via other users
- Layered design seems sensible
 - Layered controls
 - Layered Audit
 - Don't rely on core session values
 - Correlate different sources
- Correct the basics first
 - Reduce access to the database and data

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Questions?

Any Final Questions?

References

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