

Introduction - Commercial Slide. 😕

- PeteFinnigan.com Limited
- Founded February 2003
- CEO Pete Finnigan
- Clients UK, States, Europe



- Specialists in researching and securing Qracle databases providing consultancy and training
- http://www.petefinnigan.com
- Author of Oracle security step-by-step
- Published many papers, regular speaker (UK, USA, Slovenia, Norway, more)
- Member of the Oak Table Network

Agenda

- What is forensics and Oracle forensics?
- In real terms what does it mean?
- What information is out there
- Are there any tools?
- The issues audit on, audit off and more
- Where to find forensic data
- Finding evidence correlating data
- Plan for forensic analysis make it easy

What is Forensics?

fo-ren-sics

- n. (used with a sing. verb)
 - **1.** The art or study of formal debate; argumentation.
- 2. The use of science and technology to investigate and establish facts in criminal or civil courts of law.

Cited from: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by <u>Houghton Mifflin Company</u>. Updated in 2003. Published by <u>Houghton Mifflin Company</u>. All rights reserved.

What is Oracle Forensics?

- Oracle forensics is the process by which someone (an auditor?) tries to determine when / how / why (and by who) something happened by gathering correlated and incriminating evidence.
- Oracle forensics often occurs when as an auditor I am called in to help a client discover how a breach occurred and hopefully some clue as to who did it.
- These techniques are often championed through the need to do this with no audit trail, no archive logs or worse – the success rates are dependent on how fast we can look and what is available.
- If this leads to criminal proceedings the evidence must be gathered without distortion or change to the system.

What Information Is Out There?

- Pete Finnigan (2003) Detecting SQL Injection in Oracle -<u>http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1714</u> some forensics ideas - mining redo, sql extraction, trace, audit
- Pete Finnigan (2004) Oracle Forensics module SANS training
- Arup nanda (2005) Mining for clues -<u>http://www.oracle.com/technology/oramag/oracle/05-jul/o45dba.html</u>
- Alex Gorbachev (2006) Log Miner for forensics -<u>http://www.pythian.com/blogs/269/oracle-logminer-helps-investigate-security-issues</u>
- Paul Wright (2006/7) Number of papers <u>http://www.oracleforensics.com</u> + his SANS GSOC paper <u>http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/application/</u>

What Information Is Out There? (2)

- David Litchfield (2007) 6 part paper -<u>http://www.databasesecurity.com/</u>
- Alejandro Vargas (2007) Log Miner 10g Implementation Example -<u>http://static7.userland.com/oracle/gems/alejandroVargas/</u> logminerexample.pdf
- David Litchfield (2007) Blackhat paper -<u>http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/forensics.ppt</u>
- 2 books (note: one of the books is not available as I write this):
 - (2007) Oracle Forensics: Paul Wright ISBN-10-0977671526
 - (2008) Oracle Forensics Analysis Using the Forensic Examiners Database Scalpel (FEDS) Tool -ISBN-10: 047019118X – *Title has changed recently*

Are There Any Tools?

- Yes and no
- There are no specific Oracle forensics tools Yet.
 - David is developing FEDS (or whatever it will eventually be called)
- Most of the evidence can be extracted with existing tools
 - Existing OS forensics tools can be used
 - Simple SQL Queries
 - Database dumps
 - More exotic options, BBED, ORA-Dude, AUL/MyDUL
 - Connect to the SGA to read the SQL in the SGA

The Issues

- The problem when you want to investigate why is that inevitably there is no audit trail
- If audit is on, then use it. Beware of testing for altered audit trails (*This is one of the key tenets* of forensics – validity and chain of custody)
- If no audit and archive log is on use the changes captured
- If no audit, no archive logs then there is still hope
- Mining blocks and redo is time consuming and error prone
- Detecting "Select" statements is harder

Where To Find Forensic Data

- TNS listener log
- Many types of trace files
- SqInet logs (server and clients)
- Sysdba audit logs
- Datafiles for deleted data
- Redo (and archive) logs
- SGA (v\$sql etc)
- Apache access logs

Oracle is great at leaving a whole swathe of evidence!!

Where To Find Forensic Data (2)

- v\$db_object_cache
- Wrh\$%% views
- Wri\$ views
- Statspack views
- col_usage\$
- Audit trails
 - AUD\$, FGA_LOG\$
 - Application audit (who/when, triggers, other)
- Flashback, recycle bin
- More?

Looking For A Password Change

👷 Oracle SQL*Plus				
File Edit Search Options Help				
\$QL> exec print_table('select * from v\$sqlarea where sql_text like ''update user\$%password%''');				
SQL_TEXT : update user\$ set				
name=:2,password=:3,datats#=:4,tempts#=:5,type#=:6,defrole=:7,resource\$=:8,pti	me			
=DECODE(to_char(:9, 'YYYY-MM-DD'), '0000-00-00', to_date(NULL),				
:9),exptime=DECODE(to_char(:10, 'YYYY-MM-DD'), '0000-00-00', to_date(NULL),				
:10),ltime=DECODE(to_char(:11, 'YYYY-MM-DD'), '0000-00-00', to_date(NULL),				
:11),astatus=:12, lcount=:13, defschclass=:14, spare1=:15 where user#=:1 SQL FULLTEXT : update user\$ set				
name=:2,password=:3,datats#=:4,tempts#=:5,type#=:6,defrole=:7,resource\$=:8,pti	The disadvantage of the SGA is that			
DECODE(to_char(:9, 'YYYY-MM-DD'), '0000-00-00', to_date(NULL),	The albadyantage of the CC/(Io that			
9),exptime=DECODE(to char(:10, 'YYYY-MM-DD'), '0000-00', to date(NULL),				
:10),ltime=DECODE(to char(:11, 'YYYY-MM-DD'), '0000-00-00', to date(NULL),	a database restart flushes it, a shared			
:11),astatus=:12, lcount=:13, defschclass=:14, spare1=:15 where user#=:1				
SQL_ID : gqkp94mxp0s87	pool fluch will also remove evidence			
SHARABLE_MEM : 26357	pool flush will also remove evidence			
PERSISTENT_MEM : 6980				
RUNTIME_MEM : 6136	and also the data is very transient.			
SORTS : 0				
JERSION_COUNT : 1 Loaded versions : 1				
JPEN VERSIONS : 0				
JSERS OPENING : 0	For a password change everything			
ETCHES : 0	I OF a passion change everything			
XECUTIONS : 1				
PX SERVERS EXECUTIONS : 0	ran as SYS so other correlations are			
ND_OF_FETCH_COUNT : 1				
ISERS_EXECUTING : 0	n a construction find the contruct we are when			
_OADS : 2	necessary to find the actual user who			
IRST_LOAD_TIME : 2007-11-28/21:02:20	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			
INVALIDATIONS : 0	did it			
PARSE_CALLS : 1 DISK READS : 0				
DISK_READS : 0 Direct Writes : 0				
BUFFER GETS : 6				
APPLICATION WAIT TIME : 0	Views such as v\$sql_bind_data and			
ONCURRENCY WAIT TIME : 0				
LUSTER_WAIT_TIME : 0				
JSER_IO_WAIT_TIME : 0	v\$sql_bind_capture can sometimes			
PLSQE_EXEC_TIME : 0				
JAVA_EXEC_TIME : 0				
ROWS_PROCESSED : 1	reveal data			
COMMAND_TYPE : 6				
PTIMIZER_MODE : CHOOSE PTIMIZER COST : 1				
IPTIMIZER_GOST : I				
289FB89A1E49800BA001000AEF9C3E2CFEA332056414555519521105555551545545558591555	hh			
2665851055110551515255151512552458515408E095020000002000000000000000000000000000				
2090017000000032001010000032001010000080830552020000000000000000000000000				

Data Gathering From AUD\$

SQL*Plus			
File Edit Search Options Help			
		ere action_name=''ALTER USER''');	_
OS_USERNAME	: ORACLE_HACK_BOX\Admin		
USERNAME	: SCOTT		
USERHOST	: WORKGROUP\ORACLE_HACK_BO)X	
TERMINAL	: ORACLE_HACK_BOX		
TIMESTAMP	: 24-nov-2007 22:01:08		
OWNER	:		
OBJ_NAME	: SYSTEM		
ACTION	: 43		
ACTION_NAME	: ALTER USER		
NEW_OWNER	:		
NEW_NAME	:	The advantage of the audit	
OBJ_PRIVILEGE	:	C C	
SYS_PRIVILEGE	:	trail is that historic data is	
ADMIN_OPTION	:		
GRANTEE	:		
AUDIT_OPTION	:	present	
SES_ACTIONS	:	procont	
LOGOFF_TIME	:		
LOGOFF_LREAD	:		
LOGOFF_PREAD	:		
LOGOFF_LWRITE	:		
LOGOFF_DLOCK	:		
COMMENT_TEXT	:		
SESSIONID	: 651		
ENTRYID	: 2		
STATEMENTID	: 7		
RETURNCODE	: 0		
PRIV_USED	: ALTER USER		
CLIENT_ID	:		
ECONTEXT_ID	:		
SESSION_CPU	:		
EXTENDED_TIMESTAMP	: 24-NOV-07 22.01.07.6090	30 +00:00	
PROXY_SESSIONID	:		
GLOBAL_UID	:		
INSTANCE_NUMBER	: 0		
OS_PROCESS	: 2768:8024		
TRANSACTIONID	•		
SCN	: 0		
SQL_BIND	-		
SQL_TEXT	-		
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT			F

Audit trail Example

- If an audit trail exists then this can provide the best evidence
 - Check for SYS.AUD\$ or core audit to OS
 - Check for SYS.FGA_LOG\$
 - Check for Triggers and shadow tables
 - Test for who/when (E-Business Suite supports this)
- Don't depend on audit though as it may have been altered! (you need to prove it is valid)
- Detect possible data changes first
 - Look for gaps
 - Correlate the audit trail (time, rowid, session, access and change to the audit trail itself – audit on audit)

Audit Example 2

🛓 Oracle SQL*Plus					
File Edit Search Options	Help				
SQL> 1					
1 select rowid,us 2* from sys.aud\$	serid,acti	.con#,obj\$r	name	Beware of deleted rows	
SQL> /				Dewale of deleted tows	
ROWID	USERID	ACTION#	OBJ\$NAME	Can you spot the issue?	
AAAAIUAABAAABFKAAA	SCOTT	101			
IAAA I UAABAAABFKAAC	х	101			
AAAA I UAABAAABFKAAD	SYSTEM	100			
AAAAIUAABAAABFKAAE	SYSTEM	100			
AAAIUAABAAABFKAAF	SYSTEM	101			
AAAIUAABAAABFKAAG	SYSTEM		SYSTEM		
AAAAIUAABAAABFKAAH	X	101			
AAAAIUAABAAABFKAAI	SYSTEM	101			
AAAIUAABAAABFKAAJ AAAIUAABAAABFKAAK	X System	101 101			
AAAAIUAABAAABFKAAL	X	101			
ROWID	USERID	ACTION#	OBJ\$NAME		
AAAIUAABAAABFKAAM	SYSTEM	101			
AAAIUAABAAABFKAAN	SYSTEM	100			
AAAIUAABAAABFKAAO	SYSTEM		SYSTEM		
AAAAIUAABAAABFKAAP	SYSTEM	7	AUD\$		
15 rows selected.					
SQL>					
•					F

	Timestar	nps
SQL*Plus File Edit Search Options Help		
SQL> exec print_table('select USER# NAME TYPE# PASSWORD DATATS# TEMPTS# CTIME PTIME EXPTIME	* from sys.user\$ where name : 5 : SYSTEM : 1 : D4DF7931AB130E37 : 0 : 3 : 30-aug-2005 13:50:29 : 28-nov-2007 21:02:20	-''SYSTEM''');
LTIME RESOURCE\$ AUDIT\$ DEFROLE DEFGRP# DEFGRP_SEQ# ASTATUS LCOUNT DEFSCHCLASS EXT_USERNAME SPARE1 SPARE2 SPARE3	- - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Using timestamps on the object you are investigating or in general across the database can be useful to detect change and also for correlation
SPARE4 SPARE5 SPARE6 PL/SQL procedure successfully	completed.	This is one of the tenets of forensics – create a timeline
SQL>		

Correlation

- Use correlation in two ways
 - If you have one piece of evidence look for others with matching values (could be time, address, sql_hash, scn, xid ...)
 - If you don't know what to search for, i.e. you have been hacked but not sure how but know the time period; use the timestamp to locate all correlated evidence.
- Use timestamps on objects, redo (Log Mining) and more within the database
- Correlate time based evidence with external sources (oracle) such as listener.log, sql*net logs, sysdba trace, OS evidence and more
- Correlate user information with OS logs, client PC logs, firewalls, personal firewalls, web server logs

Tertiary Data – Listener.log

TextPad - IC:\oracle 10gr2\NETWORK\og\istener.log] 📰 File Edit Search View Tools Macros Configure Window Help 🗅 😂 🖬 🗐 🚭 🐧 🗐 🙏 🖻 🏛 으 으 🚐 🧊 🐷 🥤 🎱 🌾 🖆 🙀 🔹 🗤 🕨 🕅 28-DEC-2006 20:39:37 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:39:40 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:39:55 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:39:55 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:40:09 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=_jdbc__)(USER=))(SERVICE_NAME=ora10gr2)) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 4380)) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DÉC-2006 20:40:10 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:40:12 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=__jdbc__)(USER=))(SERVICE_NAME=ora10gr2)) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 2830) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:40:12 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=_jdbc__)(USER=))(SERVICE_NAME=ora10gr2)) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 4384)) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:40:12 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=_jdbc__)(USER=))(SERVICE_NAME=ora10gr2)) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 4385)) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0 4305)) * Establish * Oldlogic * Oldlogic * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:40:13 * service_update * oral0gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:41:01 * service_update * oral0gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:41:34 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=_jdbc__)(USER=))(SERVICE_NAME=oral0gr2)) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 28-DEC-2006 20:41:34 * (CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=_jdbc__)(USER=))(SERVICE_NAME=oral0gr2)) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 28-DEC-2006 20:41:34 * (CID=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 28-DEC-2006 20:41:34 * (CID=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 28-DEC-2006 20:41:34 * (CID=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT= 28-DEC-2006 20:41:34 * (CID=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT=192.168.254.27)(PORT=192.168.254.27)(PORT=192.168.254.27)(PORT=192.168.254.27)(PORT=192.168.254.27)(PORT=192.168.254.27)(PORT=192.168.254.27)(PORT=192.254.27)(PORT=192.254.27)(PORT=192.254.27)(PORT=192.254.27)(PORT=192.254.27)(PORT=192.254.27)(PORT=192.254. 28-DEC-2006 20:41:39 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(RCGRAM=C)(NOSI=___)(NOSI=__)(NOSI=_)(N (PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT=4453)) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:41:47 * ping * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:41:50 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=)(USER=SYSTEM))(COMMAND=status)(ARGUMENTS=64)(SERVICE=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=TCP)(HOST= oracle_hack_box)(PORT=1522)))(VERSION=169869568)) * status * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:41:56 * (CONNECT_DATA=(SID=ora10gr2)(CID=(PROGRAM=c:\oracle_10gr2\perl\5.8.3\bin\MSWin32=x86=multi=thread\perl.exe)(HOST=0RACLE_HACK_BOX) (USER=SYSTEM))) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192)(CID=(PROGRAM=c:\oracle_10gr2\perl\5.8.3\bin\MSWin32=x86=multi=thread\perl.exe)(HOST=0RACLE_HACK_BOX) (USER=SYSTEM))) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192)(EID=(PROGRAM=c:\oracle_10gr2\perl\5.8.3\bin\MSWin32=x86=multi=thread\perl.exe)(HOST=0RACLE_HACK_BOX) (USER=SYSTEM))) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192)(BOST=192 (PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT=4453)) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:44:40 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:44:44 * SERVICE_Unite * Oralogr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:46:44 * ping * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:46:54 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=)(USER=SYSTEM) oracle_hack_box)(PORT=1522)))(VERSION=169869568)) * status * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:46:55 * (CONNECT_DATA=(SID=ora10gr2)(CID=(PROGRAM=c:\orac (USER=SYSTEM))) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT=4711 00 DEC-20020200 * 12:40 correllations.

Arup nanda has a great three part paper – Mining Information from the listener log -

http://www.dbazine.com/oracle/or-

articles/nanda14

28-DEC-2006 20:47:13 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0

28-DEC-2006 20:50:10 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0

28-DÉC-2006 20:51:28 * service_update * ora10gr2 * 0

4895)) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0

4917)) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0

28-DEC-2006 20:50:22 * service_update * oral0gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:50:52 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=__jdbc__)(USER 4894)) * establish * ora10gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:50:52 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=__jdbc__)(USEF

4055)) * establish * oral0gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:50:52 * service_update * oral0gr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:50:59 * (CONNECT_DATA=(SID=oral0gr2)(CID=(PROGRAM=c:\orac. (USER=SYSTEM))) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=192.168.254.27)(PORT=4902 28-DEC-2006 20:51:07 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=__jdbc___)(USER*

4908)) * establish * oralogr2 * 0 28-DEC-2006 20:51:17 * (CONNECT_DATA=(CID=(PROGRAM=)(HOST=_jdbc__)(USER

_ 8 ×

- 8 ×

Tertiary Data – SYSDBA Audit

	ent Pr	operties		<u>? ×</u>
	Event			
	Date: Time: Type: User: Compu	26/11/2007 11:16:26 Information N/A Iter: ORACLE_H	Category: None Event ID: 34	 ★ ■
Description: Audit trail: ACTION : "CONNECT" DATABASE USER: "/" PRIVILEGE : SYSDBA CLIENT USER: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM CLIENT TERMINAL: ORACLE_HACK_BOX STATUS: 0 .				
			On *Nix boxes look in audit_file_dest for the files. PID based trace files – hard to corre	
	Data:	💿 Bytes 🔿 🗤	Shows SYS (actually SYSDBA) audit if audit_sys_operations=TRUE	
	-		Connects are audited by default as sysdb	

Deleted Data

- David introduced the idea of looking for deleted data in data blocks in his 6 part Oracle forensics series.
- This is not new as others more concerned with recovery, block internals, DUL like tools have found this years ago.
- The idea is being built into FEDS (we believe)
- Beware:
 - This is unsupported in terms of undefined results
 - The deleted data is transient
- Recycle bin and Flashback also good options (If available)
- As are Redo and archive logs (not transient) again if available
- Tools like BBED could be used or hex editors

Database Dumps			
TextPad - [C:\oracle\admin\ora10gr2\udump\ora10gr2_ora_1236.trc]			
🛛 🗅 😅 🔜 🖪 🖨 🖪 🖪 👗 🖬 🕄 🗠 🕮 📾 🖛 🚔 🖷 🗎	🏈 🎨 💱 🖓 👁 q‡ 🙀 🔹 🕫 🕨 🕅		
BUCKET 67381 total object count=	-1		
<pre>namespace=CRSR flags=RON/KGHP/TI kkkk-dddd-llll=0000-0001-0001 ld lwt=254DCA7C[254DCA7C,254DCA7C] pwt=254DCA60[254DCA60,254DCA60] ref=254DCA9C[254DCA9C,254DCA9C] LIBRARY OBJECT: object=2fb0add type=CRSR flags=EXS[0001] pfla CHILDREN: size=16 child# table peference</pre>	ed by ******* 30737 timestamp=11-28-2007 21:02:19 M/PN0/SML/KST/DBN/MTX/[120100d0] ock=0 pin=0 latch#=3 hpc=0000 hlc=0000 ltm=254DCA84[254DCA84,254DCA84] ptm=254DCA68[254DCA68,254DCA68] lnd=254DCAA8[254DC430,254EF33C] 18		
	ace name library_cache level 10';		
DATA BLOCKS: data# heap pointer 0 2560dc28 2fb0ae70 I/- BUCKET 67383 total object cou	ession altered.		

Investigation Without Disturbance


- If a suspected breach has occurred
- Plan ahead i.e. don't blunder in
- Consider:
 - Can the results of the investigation be trusted
 - Altering the database or shutting down could remove evidence – e.g. shared pool is cleared
 - The investigation should not alter the data or create a large foot print in the database thereby changing the value of the investigation

Investigation Without Disturbance (2)

- Establish the server state users, ports, files, dll's, memory, system time etc
- Collect Oracle files sysdba trace, archive logs, alert log, listener log, sqlnet logs, trace, copy data files (if possible)
- Grab the SQL from v\$sql (direct SGA access is an option <u>http://www.petefinnigan.com/other.htm</u>)
- Grab SYS.AUD\$ and SYS.FGA_LOG\$
- Grab AWR and statspack if available
- Analyse changes to users and roles and privileges
- Checksum the PL/SQL, Java, triggers, views
- Investigate

Log Miner			
🛃 Oracle SQL*Plus	-D×		
File Edit Search Options Help			
SQL> connect sys/change_on_install as sysdba Connected.	4		
SQL> select distinct member logfilename from v\$logfile;			
LOGFILENAME			
C:\ORACLE\ORADATA\ORA10GR2\REDO03.LOG C:\ORACLE\ORADATA\ORA10GR2\REDO02.LOG C:\ORACLE\ORADATA\ORA10GR2\REDO01.LOG			
<pre>SQL> begin 2 dbms_logmnr.add_logfile('C:\ORACLE\ORADATA\ORA10GR2\RED003.LOG'); 3 dbms_logmnr.add_logfile('C:\ORACLE\ORADATA\ORA10GR2\RED002.LOG'); 4 dbms_logmnr.add_logfile('C:\ORACLE\ORADATA\ORA10GR2\RED001.LOG'); 5 end; 6 /</pre>			
<pre>SQL> begin 2 dbms_logmnr.start_logmnr(options => dbms_logmnr.dict_from_online_catalog); 3 end; \$ 4 /</pre>			

	Log Miner 2	
🛓 Oracle SQL*Plus		<u>-0×</u>
File Edit Search Options Help SQL> SQL> edit aud SQL> get aud 1 select username,to_char(1 2 seg_owner,operation,sql_u 3 from v\$logmnr_contents 4 where table_name='AUD\$' 5* and sql_redo like '%AAAA1 6 /		
USERNAME	TIMESTAMP	
SEG_OWNER	OPERATION	
SQL_UNDO		
NULL, "LOGOFF\$PREAD" = NULL, ' FF\$TIME" = NULL, "SESSIONCPU" '0' and "LOGOFF\$LREAD" = '282	29-NOV-2007 21:29:38 UPDATE DN#" = '100', "RETURNCODE" = '0', "LOGOFF\$LREAD" = 'LOGOFF\$LWRITE" = NULL, "LOGOFF\$DEAD" = NULL, "LOG = NULL where "ACTION#" = '101' and "RETURNCODE" = ' and "LOGOFF\$PREAD" = '0' and "LOGOFF\$LWRITE" = ' "LOGOFF\$TIME" = TO_DATE('29-NOV-07', 'DD-MON-RR')	30 - 5
USERNAME	TIMESTAMP	
SEG_OWNER	OPERATION	
SQL_UNDO		
and "SESSIONCPU" = '6' and ROV SQL>	/ID = 'AAAAIuAABAAABFKAAB';	- -
01/05/2008	Copyright (c) 2007	25




Build A Toolkit

- What can we build as toolkit?
- Mining blocks not ideal time biased and not consistent – FEDS look promising BUT
- A Tool kit should / Could be methodology include:
 - A plan of actions
 - OS commands to gather files
 - SQL commands to gather details from the database
 - Dump commands

Conclusions

- Looked at what are forensics and what are Oracle forensics?
- Looked at what information is out there
- Looked at the issues audit on, audit off and more
- Looked at where to find forensic data
- Looked at finding evidence correlating data
- Oracle Forensics is a new and exciting area and very current due to recent data losses



01/05/2008

