

UKOUG Windows SIG, September 25th 2007

Oracle Security on Windows

By
Pete Finnigan

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Introduction - commercial slide. ☹️

- PeteFinnigan.com Limited
- Founded February 2003
- CEO Pete Finnigan
- Clients UK, States, Europe
- Specialists in researching and securing Oracle databases
- <http://www.petefinnigan.com>
- Consultancy and training available
- Author of Oracle security step-by-step
- Published many papers, regular speaker (UK, USA)



Agenda

- What is Oracle Security?
- Common security issues
- Windows / Unix differences issues
- Windows security
 - Information, bugs
- Windows security differences
- Auditing a database
- Hardening a database

What is Oracle Security

- Performing a security audit of an Oracle database?
- Securely configuring an Oracle database?
- Designing a secure Oracle system before implementation?
- Using some of the key security features
 - Audit, encryption, RBAC, FGA, VPD...
- Oracle security is all of these
 - It is about creating a secure database
 - Storing critical / valuable data securely

What's involved in securing data?

- Perform an Oracle Security health audit
- Design a secure installation
- Perform database hardening
 - New database or existing
- Choose and use Security features where relevant e.g.
 - encryption in the database for credit cards
 - TDE for secure data on disk
 - VPD to enable secure access to critical data

Common Security Issues

- Installation issues
- Feature overload Some examples from real life!!
- Functionality not needed in the database
- Configuration issues
- Operating system - Some real horrors often found
- Network issues – usually not much security
- Bugs / vulnerabilities - no easy fix

Unix and Windows

- Is there a difference for securing Oracle on Windows or Unix? – anyone?
- In the database – very small differences in configuration
- Oracle networking – small differences
- Operating system – yes, biggest area but the issues are not dissimilar to Unix
- We will highlight some of the differences shortly

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Windows Oracle Security Info

- There is a lack of Windows specific information on Oracle security - example:
- SANS SCORE – 5 Windows from hundreds (<http://www.sans.org/score/oraclechecklist.php?portal=06e42a60647bfcf9d1afc5b9bdf932b3>)
- CIS Benchmark (v1.2 and 2.0.1) – 21 Windows from hundreds in 10g version - (<http://www.cisecurity.org/>)
- SANS Step-By-Step guide v2 – 4 from hundreds
- Oracle hackers Handbook – 2 pages from @120
- Oracle Privacy Security Auditing – no specific Windows issues

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General Oracle Security Info

- All is not lost; most Oracle security guidelines, information and tools are useful also for Windows
- Tools – <http://www.petefinnigan.com/tools.htm>
 - Who_has scripts, CIS benchmark, Scuba, Metacortex, cqure, many more
- Papers, blogs, forums
- Checklists
 - CIS, SCORE, DoD Stig, Oracles hardening document
- Websites – petefinnigan, cqure, RDS, Argeniss, databasesecurity.com

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Windows Oracle Bugs

- As with Oracle security information specific Oracle security bugs on Windows are a small percentage of the whole
- Unlike the lack of information where the positive effect is that 95% of other information is still relevant with bugs most are still exploitable against Windows hosted Oracle ..☺
- ORA_DBA / AcceptSecurityContext / share bug – see OHH
- Windows privilege escalation – NULL DACL bug <http://securityvulns.com/news/Oracle/Windows/PE.html>
- Windows directory traversal – extension of previous generic bugs
- 35 bugs on Securiteam – only 1 (possibly 2) are Windows specific
- Milw0rm.com – 4 Windows specific (?) from 27
- BugTraq – Hundreds of issues, difficult to check, possibly 1 in 20/30
- RDS – approx 40 exploits – only one confirmed for just Windows

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Windows Oracle bugs

- As with any exploit / bug; patching is generally the only solution – very few have workarounds
- The action for the DBA is therefore to
 - Be on a supported version of the database
 - Be on a supported platform – i.e. no Windows home edition
 - Be on the latest patch release
 - Ensure CPU's are applied as promptly as possible

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Windows Differences

- Don't install on domain controller (install on domain member/stand alone)
 - If domain services required use RSA and should it be a domain user account not domain admin
 - Create global group, remove from domain group
 - Remove domain users from Users group
- Windows has default Administrator account – rename it
- Oracle must be installed as Local Admin or SYSTEM (No) – Unix doesn't require admin – deny Logon

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Windows Differences (2)

- Limit AT jobs
- Oracle provides Windows Native Authentication
- Audit goes to the event viewer – use SQL to archive and purge and to filter and monitor
- File permissions
 - Remove Everyone group from ORACLE_HOME ORACLE_BASE
 - Allow Local Administrator full control
 - Remove Users permissions on Program Files\Oracle
 - Do not allow Oracle owner access to system tools

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Windows Differences (3)

- Possibility to stop port redirection in Windows – use_shared_socket=TRUE
- Set OSAUTH_PREFIX_DOMAIN= TRUE in registry to prevent OS account spoofing
- Don't allow Everyone group access to registry and limit access to Oracle keys/ hives to owner
- Windows tends to include additional protocol stacks
- Limited Possibility to rename ORA_DBA
 - Don't allow any OS user membership of ORA_DBA except Oracle DBA

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Windows Differences (Subtle)

- Excessive services enabled by default
 - Net meeting, messenger, auto update,
 - Web servers, fax, DHCP etc
 - Ensure OS is hardened first
- Shares – authentication bug
- virus software needed on Windows (Unix usually not a major issue)
- Maintenance access is usually harder
 - Local access or terminal services
 - SSH shell access (Unix) not available

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Auditing Oracle Databases

- We cannot cover a complete security audit here
- Default passwords, weak passwords, password management
- Audit settings
- Configuration settings
- File system – passwords exposed, ad hoc maintenance
- Shares – check for existence
- Confirm accounts used for software, Admin, Application / privileges
- Tendency for remote ops\$ to be used on Windows – check into this

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Auditing an Oracle Database

- Windows security Checklists
 - CIS benchmarks for XP-SP1/2, Server 2003, Win 2000 (Std, Prof, server), NT
 - Windows tools – The CIS benchmarks are useful – others are available
- Oracle security checks
 - Most tools are windows centric – don't install them on the prod
 - Audit by hand
 - Audit using a free or commercial tool
 - Get professional help
- Oracle security checklists
 - use and work through
 - these are great resources to start with


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Windows OS Security Audit (1)

<http://www.cisecurity.org/>



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Hardening


- Reduce the features and functions installed – OS and DB
- Harden the OS – covered above
- Review RBAC for all users
- Remove defaults – settings, users, passwords
- Decide on secure configuration settings
- Clean up
- Create processes and policies to ensure secure data going forward

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Features



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RBAC

- Review the complete RBAC model
- Understand default schemas installed and why
- Understand the application schemas
 - Privileges, objects, resources
- Understand which accounts are Admin / user / Application Admin etc
 - Consider privileges, objects, resources
- lock accounts if possible
 - reduce attack surface

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Defaults

- Defaults are one of the biggest issues in Oracle
- Most default accounts in existence
- Tens of thousands of public privileges granted
- Many default roles and privileges
 - Many application developers use default Roles unfortunately
- Reduce the Public privileges as much as possible
- Do not use default accounts
- Do not use default roles including DBA
- Do not use default passwords

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Database Configuration

- Default database installations cause some weak configurations
- Review all
 - configuration parameters
 - File permissions
- Some examples
 - No audit configuration by default (fixed in 10gR2 for new installs)
 - No password management (fixed in 10gR2 new installs)

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Clean Up

- This is the security killer in most systems I see
- Often file systems include
 - Scripts with passwords
 - Use tools such as
 - Oracle Password Repository
 - Mksstore from Oracle
 - DBMS_JOBS, DBMS_SCHEDULER
 - OS authenticated users under certain circumstances
- Clean up
 - ad-hoc scripts
 - Maintenance evidence
 - Trace files
 - Audit logs....

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Create a Policy

- Perform an Oracle database audit
- Define what the key/critical issues are
- Determine / decide what to fix
- Work on a top 20 basis and cycle (This is effective for new hardening)
- Create a baseline standard
 - A document
 - Scripts – maybe for BMC
 - Commercial tool such as AppDetective

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Decide what to fix

- My extensive experience of auditing Oracle databases is that there are
 - Usually a lot of security issues
 - Usually a lot are serious – i.e. server access could be gained if the issue is not plugged
 - There are constraints on the applications, working practice, practicality of fixing
- The best approach is to classify issues
 - Must fix now (really serious), fix as soon as possible, fix when convenient, maybe more
- Create a top ten / twenty approach

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Enable Database Auditing

- Every database I have ever audited has no database audit enabled – ok a small number do, but usually the purpose if for management / work / ??? but not for audit purposes.
- Core audit doesn't kill performance
 - Oracle have recommended 24 core system audit settings since 10gR2 – these can be enabled and added to in earlier databases
 - Avoid object audit unless you analyse access trends then its Ok
- On Windows audit directed to the OS goes to the event Log
- By default all SYSDBA connections are audited – also to the event log on Windows
- VBScript / SQL can be used to access the event log

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Conclusions

- Securing Oracle on Windows is not drastically different to Unix
- Most documentation / checklists / tools are valid for Windows
- Most Oracle security tools are available on Windows – don't install them on prod!
- The key techniques are the same
- Database security is about the data and Oracle isolates the OS quite well
- Don't forget to harden the OS though!

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create or replace function log_start(rn path
return url_file_type as
lv_fpr url_file_type
lv_md5 varchar2(32) := ''
begin
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end;

Any Questions?

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