

Securing Data

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Securing Data

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
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Pete Finnigan – Background, Who Am I?

- Oracle Security specialist and researcher
- CEO and founder of PeteFinnigan.com Limited in February 2003
- Writer of the longest running Oracle security blog
- Author of the Oracle Security step-by-step guide and "Oracle Expert Practices", "Oracle Incident Response and Forensics" books
- Oracle ACE for security
- Member of the OakTable
- Speaker at various conferences
 - UKOUG, PSOUG, BlackHat, more..
- Published many times, see
 - <u>http://www.petefinnigan.com</u> for links
- Influenced industry standards
 - And governments







Agenda

- Data Security landscape
- The focus on data security
- History of securing Oracle
- Current data and Oracle Security landscape
- Main threats to Oracle databases
- The focus in fixing database security
- Secure your data or BUST



Data Security Landscape




I had a conversation with a taxi driver recently and he didn't know what a data breach was BUT proceeded to tell me how he was scammed out of a loan payment. His identity was stolen and he paid a loan repayment but never got any money

Hacking And Data Theft

- Data security is not a niche subject anymore
- The BBC even has a dedicated breach page
- Experts no longer wheeled in to discuss a breach
- It is main stream

Data Breaches Expose 4.1 Billion Records In First Six Months Of **2019**. According to Risk Based **Security** research newly published in the **2019** MidYear QuickView **Data Breach** Report, the first six months of **2019** have seen more than 3,800 publicly disclosed **breaches** exposing an incredible 4.1 billion compromised records. Aug 20, 2019



Data Breaches Expose 4.1 Billion Records In First Six Months ... https://www.forbes.com > sites > daveywinder > 2019/08/20 > data-breaches-...




Major Fines



What about the other 27 EU States + the rest of the world who lost their data (339 Million records lost) – More fines?

Large Fine by ICO - Marriot





The Rise of Hacking



In The Beginning We have Bragging Rights

- Phiber Optik Mark Abene Masters of Deception Legion of Doom <u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Abene</u>
- Erik Bloodaxe Chris Goggans Legion of Doom editor of Phrack -<u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erik_Bloodaxe_(hacker)</u>
- The great Hacker War 1990/91 -<u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Hacker_War</u> - Phiber Optik stated it was a fabrication by US Government
- 2600 Emanuel Goldstein Ed, Captain Crunch, Hackerdom, Defcom...
- Kevin Mitnik The Darkside, The Condor.. The most wanted man -<u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kevin_Mitnick</u> - A judge thought he could start a nuclear war by whistling into a pay phone!
- Solo Gary McKinnon accused of the biggest military hack of all time - <u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gary_McKinnon</u> - Free energy suppression and UFO cover-ups! – perl for blank/ default passwords



Snowdon and NSA Tools – Government Hacking

- Edward Snowdon copied and leaked CIA, NSA highest level data in 2013 - <u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden</u> and ran to Hong Kong and then Russia.
 - Leaked details of government level hacking, global surveillance, cyber attacks, tools and much more
 - The key point for us is that he had "virtually unlimited access to data" and was able to exfiltrate 50,000 to 200,000 files / records
 - Created the NSA backup system!
- Julian Assange in the Equador embassy from 2012 to 2019 wiki leaks – but also hacker in 1987 hacking as Mendax -<u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange</u> - hacking US government and Pentagon
- NSA hacking tools hacked -<u>http://thehackernews.com/2016/12/nsa-hack-shadow-brokers.html</u> can be downloaded for free

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Hacking Team – Hacking tools Hacked and for Sale

- Hacked in July 2015
- Phineas Fisher pseudo name hacked "Hacking Team" with over 100 hours of effort – He was never found
- 400gb of emails, documents, embarrassing information and most importantly the hacking toolkit Remote Control System (RCS) they sell to countries stolen
- Posted to Pastebin with details of how the hack happened -<u>http://pastebin.com/raw/0SNSvyjJ</u> - (removed)
- 0-Days used, found a Blackberry password and then accessed to a domain server allowed all other user passwords to be found in email. Then Fisher found a sysadmins email to get a github password for source code and bridge to the internal dev network



The Data Gold Rush

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Data Gold Rush

- Data is the new gold think 1896 to 1899 klondike in the Yukon
 - Usage patterns
 - User and customer behaviour
 - Company data
 - Tracking data all GDPR
- Companies are starting to realise the importance of data
- Social media is massive
- Data driven advertising
 - Facebook, Google, Snowden and the NSA!
- Cultivated data is the way forwards
 - Not necessarily massive computing power and big data
 - Not always volume and velocity of data



Pure Data Crime



Criminals Steal Data – It is Easier Than Violence

- There is a major upsurge in data theft now
- It is safer for criminals to steal data than to walk into a bank with a sawn off shotgun
- It is not about bragging rights anymore
- Hard to know if Oracle is involved in each data theft case
- There is a ready market for stolen data on the dark web
- Breaches listed (some) at http://www.breachlevelindex.com
- ICO summary of data breaches <u>https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/data-security-incident-trends/</u> e.g. Bounty UK fined £400,000 not extensive list
- I personally have been involved in post breach investigations against quite a few Oracle based systems



The Rise of The Empire



- See <u>https://gdpr-info.eu</u> for details
- Also USA data breach notification laws (1386), Sox, GLB, Hippa
- £20M fine or 4% of Company GDP

GDPR

- General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Regulation EU 2016/679)
- Replaces the data protection derivative 95/46/EC in 1995
- Adopted by EU 27 April 2016
- Enforced from 25th May 2018
- Does not require national governments to pass any enabling legislation so was binding straight away in May 2018
- Each member state established a Supervising Authority (SA)
- Authority in the UK is the ICO (Information Commissioners Office)



Section

History of Locking Down



Brief History Of Locking Down Oracle

- When I started to secure Oracle there were "no" or next to "no" books, papers, tools or security patches
- No one else was specializing in Oracle security in the database that I knew of
- Then in 2001 I was asked to write the SANS Oracle step-by-step guide
 - This also lead to the SANS S.C.O.R.E
 - SANS donated the book to CIS for the first Oracle benchmark



Database Security 22 Years Ago

- Companies were interested in data security BUT
 - Lack of budgets for most companies (desktop/network)
- Legacy thinking
 - Functionality / SLA
 - Not security of Oracle or data in Oracle
- Tendency to think that its someone else's issue; OS, Network, Firewalls etc; just not the Oracle database
 - My experience from 1999 was an audit by KPMG / Delloite
 - Just file permissions of the Oracle software, no actual database settings, parameters, users etc
- I decided to do better



Section

Oracle Security Options



Security Options

- Oracle (the database) security features are immense:
 - Parameters and privileges on everything
 - Audit trails and lockdown profiles
 - User profiles and more
- Core security options must be done first (come back to that in a minute)
- SE, EE all include core security features
- Oracle sell security in cost options



Additional Security Cost Options - Usually Not Free

- Database Vault primary tool to protect against privilege accounts and to put realms around data/function
- Oracle Label Security Allows data to be accessed by row level labels and the users current label access level
- Data Redaction (ASO) Redact some data from end users black like through data!
- Transparent Sensitive Data Protection create classes of sensitive data to allow more centralised way of protecting sensitive data – uses VPD and Data Redaction
- Transparent Database Encryption allows data to be encrypted at rest – either at tablespace level or at the column level
- Oracle Data Masking find data to mangle / obfuscate and specify rules to then change that data – keeping referential integrity
- Audit Vault and Database Firewall– centralised database for audit storage including certificate based confirmation of data



Secure The Core Database

- Secure the core database first using std features
- A security option from Oracle is just an application
- The cost option (application)
 - Must be configured for your ideas / use. OOTB they usually do not do what you want
 - Security option must be secured as well
 - The interfaces, API, metadata, custom code
 - i.e. in VPD if you make the predicate function public anyone can run it or if a user has ALTER SYSTEM then can set events 10060 or 10730
- We can simulate cost options for free

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


Current Data and Oracle Security Landscape



My Current Security State of Oracle Databases

• My current experience of the state of Oracle database security can be summed up below.





Oracle Security in 2023

- I still see a reliance on traditional security ideas
 - Network security, firewalls, desktop, AD, anti-virus
 - I also see too big a focus on things like the CIS benchmark
 - This is focused on patch and harden
 - It is missing many things, 12c, 18c, 19c, CDB/PDB, ASM, newer...
 - It is a consensus but the consensus is too small
 - Its 10-15 years out of date
- I see a push to tick boxes
 - Buy TDE but don't otherwise secure the data in motion
 - Buy Database Vault but still have one admin person with root, Oracle, SYSDBA and DV realm owner, DV admin etc



Main Focus When Fixing Database Security




What Is Oracle Security?

• It is not Oracle's Security

It is our security of our data



Compartmentalise Data Security?





Lets Expand On the Sections

- Platform security
 - Security patching
 - Database Hardening
 - Database access controls
- Data security design
 - Access controls
 - User security (least rights)
 - Data security (access controls)
 - Context based security
 - Audit trails



The Process To Secure Oracle

- Perform a detailed audit of a single production database
- Review existing security policy
- Develop and decide fixing strategy
 - For data security
 - For platform security
- Develop a database security policy
 - Develop a policy document
 - Create a lock down set of tools / steps
 - Initial lock down for all databases
 - Lockdown specific to data and application access
 - Develop policies for a scanner or scripts
- Lock down
 - New
 - Existing
- Check for compliance
- Update, Renew, Extend



Access Controls

- The number 1 issue; stop people connecting to your database
- Remove users that are not needed
- Strong passwords, schema only, lock
- Limit SYSDBA to local on server only
- Limit network paths (firewall, valid node, listener)
- Use logon triggers to limit at the tool or source location level – use hashes not strings – add delays
- Use error triggers (logon only fires on success)



Harden The Database

- Start with CIS but go further
- Remove default users and features
- Change security parameters
- Remove grants on PL/SQL, views, tables
- Lock down the listener
- Add password profiles
- Add a designed DBA role
- Default passwords
- Limit COMMON rights
- Use lockdown profiles



User Security

- Remove all duplicate users, not used users
- Remove excessive rights (system rights, Oracle roles, grants)
- Sod and Col
- Remove duplicates and create separation
- Aim to least rights and only needed users
- Profiles
- DBA, support, third party and release



Data Access Controls

- Data domains allow privilege design
- Separate schemas
- Connection users (not the schema)
- Lock schemas
- Ensure data security is in the database (VPD, RAS, Home grown)
- Control resources and privilege use (API)
- Secure the application PL/SQL
- De-duplicate data



Context Based Security

- Add identity get/set, Oracle does not do this for you
- Add context based access to the database
- Context based DML
- Context based READ of data
- Context based code (API access)
- Implement Breakglass



Audit Trails

- Implement a comprehensive audit trail for
 - The database engine
 - Data access
- Use Std, Unified, FGA or custom audit
- Design the audit
 - Don't just list and enable random settings
 - "What do I want to know?"
 - Include everything
 - Management, sizing, policy, escalation, alerts, reports, users
 - Secure the audit trail



Secure Databases In the Cloud

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The Move to Cloud

- Oracle and others have a big push to cloud?
- But data security must be first
- A database with data insecurities on premise is not magically secure in the cloud
- Cloud infrastructure may be more secure than yours
 - if remote already
 - If on premise data center then traffic is now remote
- There is nothing inherently wrong with cloud if your servers are not in your building already then its just a remote server already;
 - A risk is producer / consumer responsibilities and who you are sharing with
 - It is the risk that data security is not adequately done in legacy already; adding TDE or DV does not correct inherent design issues and moving legacy bad data doesn't make security.



Main Threats to Oracle Databases

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Oracle Database Security Threats

- I see and perform audits of a lot of Oracle databases and I see a similar level of lack of security across all verticals
- One of the biggest threats is that security is not the default in Oracle
- Oracle provide lots of security options BUT you have to configure them; so they are not usually implemented



Often I See In Customer Databases

- Weak passwords SYS, SYSTEM not changed for 14 years
- Lack of decent audit trails at the database level
- Applications and features installed that you don't need APEX
- 44k 39K PUBLIC rights in 12c/18c/19c/21c
- Lack of security of data
 - No schema separation
 - No grants
 - Applications have DBA, all grants, grants with GRANT...
 - Most applications that I see have MOST PRIVILEGES not LEAST PRIVILEGES
- Absolute lack of focus still on data security design



Secure Data or Bust



Secure Data Or Go Bust!!

- You must secure your data or go bust
- A legal contract does not stop someone stealing your data
- A pentest will not identify data security issues in your database
 - They maybe find 5 or 6 issues, I find 200
 - If you have 1000 databases that's 200,000 fixes
- Build a realistic and achievable security for data



Section

Gotchas

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In general you cannot just turn something ON or OFF unless you think about every consequence first – this does not mean we should not do it

Security Can be Complex

- There are many possible gotchas that need to be considered as part of securing data in Oracle
- Adding security can make access / work harder if not planned properly (password cannot be remembered if its no longer 3 characters!!)
- Security is also about people i.e.;
 - DBAs must not use SYSDBA therefore you must define a suitable set of privileges for daily use
 - Support or release must not use the schema passwd therefore lock the schema, use proxy and change release processes
- We will highlight an example in a little more detail next

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Revoking Grants

- The process:
 - Check objects are valid
 - Revoke the grant
 - Check for invalid objects
 - List the owners (schemas)

- The re-compile is flakey and can lock up or need doing more that once
- A DBA who updates the database or runs catproc.sql can "undo" the security
- Must be scripted allow reapplication as needed
- CDP/PDBs
 - Each container can be different
 - Do the PDBs first then CDB
 - Some PDBs not done?
- Jobs may have to be disabled
- CIS doesn't tell you the method
- Grant the right back to the owner (schema)
- Re-compile all objects
- Check invalid again



Conclusions

- Understand the big picture
- Build layered security
- Do not put all your eggs in the hardening only basket – such as following CIS
- Build hardening and patching before data security
- Build data security before context based security or cost options
- Cost options also must be secured
- Don't try and fix 200 issues per database



Questions / Discussion

?



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